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1. Introduction
The degree of global integration in goods, factor, and ¯nancial markets has substantially
increased over the last two decades. This process of globalization is likely to have induced
signi¯cant changes in the behavior of macroeconomic variables in most countries.
Among other things, several observers have argued that globalization may have altered
the dynamics of in°ation. First, many have recognized that globalization may have been a
contributing factor in reducing in°ation rates around the world, although the size of its e®ect
is controversial.
1 But others have o®ered the more radical argument that, in a globalized
economy, the popular closed-economy Phillips curves, which relate current in°ation rates to
expected in°ation and current domestic resource utilization, may no longer be an appropriate
description of in°ation behavior. Borio and Filardo (2007), in fact, provide empirical evidence
that shows how measures of \global", rather than domestic, economic conditions may have
now become the relevant measure of unused capacity that drives in°ation. An ensuing paper
by Ihrig et al. (2007), however, ¯nds that global output is unimportant following a similar
empirical strategy.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the empirical importance of global output as a driver of
domestic in°ation rates. But, while empirical work in this area has focused on single-equation
regressions, this paper uses a structural model, derived from microfounded behavior by house-
holds and ¯rms, and estimated using full-information techniques, to assess the relevance of
global measures of output in the sample of G-7 countries.
The use of a structural model is motivated by the need to disentangle the di®erent channels
through which global slack can play a role in the economy. Single equation estimations may
have di±culties controlling for the e®ect of global output on domestic output, for the in°uence
of monetary policies, for the e®ect of expectations, and, at least in the case of the U.S., for the
possible endogeneity of measures of global output to U.S. business cycle developments. These
factors can be all taken into account in the general equilibrium estimation.
The paper adopts the model derived in Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2002, hereafter CGG)
and Woodford (2007) to capture the potential e®ects of foreign output °uctuations on domes-
tic macroeconomic behavior. Foreign output a®ects both the aggregate supply and demand
1Several researchers (e.g., Rogo®, 2003, 2006, Ball, 2006), policymakers (e.g., Fisher, 2005, Kohn, 2006,
Bernanke, 2007), and the press (e.g., The Economist), have debated the hypothesis that globalization has led
to lower worldwide in°ation.2 FABIO MILANI
relations in the economy. It a®ects domestic output through the assumption that consumers
in the home country consume a bundle of domestically-produced and foreign-produced goods.
Foreign output can, therefore, a®ect in°ation both indirectly, through its e®ect on aggregate
demand, and directly, through its e®ect on ¯rms' marginal costs and hence on the speci¯cation
of the Phillips curve. In a globally-integrated economy, in fact, the decisions of domestic ¯rms
to change their prices depend not only on domestic factors, but also on foreign (or global)
factors.
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods on quarterly data for the United States,
Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. The sample begins in 1985,
to focus on the period in which the pace of globalization has accelerated (the starting date
follows the choices by Borio and Filardo, 2007, and Ihrig et al., 2007). The relevant global
slack measure for each country is calculated as the weighted average of the output gap series
of a large set of its main trading partners, where the weights are given by the magnitude of
the country's trade with each partner as a fraction of its total trade.
The main objective in the empirical analysis will be to check whether global output is a
signi¯cant factor in the domestic supply and demand equations. By revealing the channels
through which global output can a®ect domestic variables, the estimates can also shed light on
the bene¯ts of alternative monetary policies. If global output plays a large role, in fact, central
banks may consider actively monitoring and responding to global macroeconomic conditions.
Moreover, as shown by CGG (2002), if there are strong spillovers from foreign output to
domestic marginal costs and in°ation rates, there would be non-trivial gains from international
monetary policy coordination.
Results. The estimates reveal that measures of global slack have a sizeable in°uence on
aggregate demand in most countries. The empirical results, however, do not provide much
support for the relevance of a direct channel through which foreign output a®ects domestic
in°ation rates by entering as an additional driving variable in the Phillips curve. The estimated
sensitivities of in°ation to foreign output gaps are often negative and typically close to zero.
The best-¯tting speci¯cations for all countries, in fact, are those that include an e®ect of
global output on domestic output, but not a direct e®ect on domestic in°ation. There is,
however, some uncertainty about the role of global slack in the Phillips curves for Italy andGLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 3
France. In these cases, the speci¯cations with and without global slack in the Phillips curve
are both assigned signi¯cant posterior probabilities.
Overall, mainly through the e®ect on domestic demand, global output can still a®ect do-
mestic in°ation rates. From the variance decomposition, shocks to global conditions account
for a large share of output °uctuations in France, Germany, Canada, Italy, and the U.K., while
they are less central in the U.S. and Japan. The spillovers to in°ation are limited, as global
output shocks account for 13% of °uctuations in in°ation in France, less than 10% in the U.S.,
Italy, Canada, and the U.K., and they are unimportant in Germany and Japan.
Contribution to the Literature. The paper aims to contribute to the literature on the
e®ects of globalization on in°ation. Various papers evaluate the relationship between openness
and average in°ation rates using a cross-section of countries. Romer (1993), for example,
¯nds a robust negative relationship: average in°ation is lower in more open economies. This
paper is, however, more closely related to the debate on whether global slack has become an
important determinant of in°ation rates, and, therefore, to the work by Borio and Filardo
(2007), which provides empirical evidence in favor of the global slack hypothesis, and by Ihrig
et al. (2007), which ¯nds opposite conclusions.
2 This paper shares their main scope, but it
uses a di®erent modeling and empirical approach. The paper adopts a structural model of
in°ation and output dynamics and full-information Bayesian methods to take the model to
the data. Among other things, the general equilibrium model makes it possible to identify
two channels through which global output can in°uence in°ation: a spillover e®ect of global
output on domestic output, which seems to matter in most countries, and a direct e®ect of
global output on in°ation, which is, instead, unimportant in most countries.
The paper is also related to the recent e®orts by Sbordone (2007) and Guerrieri et al.
(2008) to model other channels through which globalization may a®ect in°ation. Sbordone
(2007) is mainly interested in analyzing how the increased competition that may be induced
by globalization a®ects the slope of the Phillips curve, i.e. the sensitivity of in°ation to domestic
economic activity or real marginal costs. The e®ect is a matter of dispute, as previous papers
have argued that globalization may either lead to a °attening of the Phillips curve (e.g., Razin
and Yuen, 2002, Razin and Loungani, 2005, and Razin and Binyamini, 2007) or to its steepening
2The evidence from other papers is also mixed: Gamber and Hung (2001) and Wynne and Kersting (2007) ¯nd
that measures of foreign capacity utilization seem to a®ect U.S. in°ation, while Tootell (1998) and Castelnuovo
(2007) ¯nd a more limited role; Calza (2008) repeats Borio and Filardo's (2007) analysis on aggregate Euro area
data and he doesn't ¯nd much support in favor of a role for global slack.4 FABIO MILANI
(Rogo®, 2003). Sbordone relaxes the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution among
di®erentiated goods, by allowing it to vary with the ¯rm's relative market share. It is through
its e®ect on market shares and hence on the elasticity of demand that globalization may a®ect
the slope of the Phillips curve in her closed economy model. This paper works, instead, with
an open economy framework, which abstracts from the channel of increased competition (or
entry of new ¯rms), as its main focus is not analyzing whether globalization has contributed
to °atten the Phillips curve, but whether globalization has made global slack a driving force
of domestic in°ation rates. Guerrieri et al. (2008) use a present-value approach to estimate
an open economy New Keynesian Phillips curve, which is derived under the assumption of a
variable elasticity of demand, and they show that foreign competition causes a reduction in the
domestic ¯rms' desired markup and, therefore, it lowers in°ation. As in the case of Sbordone's
paper, the e®ects of globalization that they stress can be seen as complementary to those in the
current paper. A recent paper by Zaniboni (2008) investigates the e®ects of globalization on the
level of in°ation, on the slope of the Phillips curve, and on the sensitivity of in°ation to global
slack. He uses a calibrated model and argues that the e®ects on the Phillips curve are likely
to be limited. The empirical evidence presented here points in the same direction, although it
illustrates how global output plays a larger role through the domestic demand channel. Milani
(2009) estimates a similar model (without in°ation indexation), but only focusing on U.S. data,
and shows that global slack is unimportant in the pre-1979 period, while it enters the Phillips
curve with a positive coe±cient in the post-1985 period; that paper, however, does not try to
assess the relative improvement in model's ¯t obtained by letting global slack play a role on
the supply or demand channel.
Other authors identify di®erent global variables that may a®ect in°ation, besides global
slack: D'Agostino and Surico (2009), for example, demonstrate that measures of global liquidity
help in forecasting in°ation. A di®erent and less directly related literature, instead, emphasizes
how in°ation has become an increasingly global phenomenon (Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2009,
Mumtaz and Surico, 2008).
Finally, the paper may inform the debate on whether globalization has changed the role
of national monetary policies (Woodford, 2007) and whether international monetary policy
cooperation may be desirable (e.g., CGG, 2002, Benigno and Benigno, 2006, Coenen et al.,
2007). The modest e®ect of global slack on in°ation identi¯ed in the empirical analysis suggestsGLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 5
that the idea that policymakers should target global measures of capacity, beyond their e®ects
as indicators of future domestic output conditions, is probably premature. Similarly, since
the literature on international monetary policy coordination has stressed that the bene¯ts of
cooperation hinge on the elasticity of in°ation to global slack, the low estimated values indicate
that the scope for cooperation is limited.
2. The Model
The economic framework that is used to study the e®ect of foreign or global output on
in°ation is a two-country New Keynesian model, which has been derived in CGG (2002), and
which has also been used by Woodford (2007) to discuss the potential impact of globalization
on the e®ectiveness of national monetary policies. In the empirical section, each G-7 country
will be considered, in turn, as the relevant Home country and a large set of its main trading
partners as the Foreign sector.
3
2.1. Households. The representative household in the Home country maximizes the dis-





















where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, ¾ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption, ' > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ³t is an aggregate







where CH;t is a Dixit-Stiglitz index of goods produced in the home country and CF;t is an index
of goods produced abroad; the coe±cient ° denotes the share of foreign-produced goods in both
the domestic and foreign households' consumption baskets.4 The °ow of budget constraints is
given each period by
PtCt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] · Bt + WtHt + ¦t ¡ Tt; (2.3)
3This section simply sketches the main elements of the model. A detailed derivation can be found in CGG
(2002) and Woodford (2007).
4As in CGG (2002) and Woodford (2007), the model is derived under the simplifying assumptions that
households in both countries consume an identical basket of goods, that the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods is equal to 1, and that there are complete ¯nancial markets.6 FABIO MILANI




F;t denotes the aggregate price level, where k ´ (1 ¡ °)1¡°°° and
PH;t and PF;t are price indices for domestically and foreign-produced goods, Qt denotes the
stochastic discount factor, Bt denotes the nominal value of the household's portfolio, Wt is
the nominal wage, Ht denotes the hours of labor supplied, ¦t denotes the pro¯ts received
from ¯rms, and Tt denotes net tax collections. Intratemporal and intertemporal optimization
implies the following ¯rst-order conditions
PH;tCH;t = (1 ¡ °)PtCt (2.4)









= (1 + it)¡1: (2.6)
The law of one price is assumed to hold at all times: this, along with the assumption of equal
consumption baskets in both countries, leads to the relation Pt = ²tP¤
t , where ²t denotes the
nominal exchange rate and P¤
t is the aggregate price index in the foreign country.
2.2. Firms. A continuum of monopolistically-competitive ¯rms populates the economy. Each




where At denotes the state of technology, ht(i) denotes the labor input for ¯rm i, and Á ¸ 1
allows for diminishing returns to the labor input. Firms are assumed to set prices µ a la Calvo.
A fraction 0 < ® < 1 of ¯rms is not allowed to reoptimize in a given period and is assumed to
simply follow the indexation rule proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
logpt(i) = logpt¡1(i) + ¶¼t¡1; (2.8)
where 0 · ¶ · 1 represents the degree of indexation to past in°ation ¼t¡1. The remaining




























; (2.10)GLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 7
where YT denotes aggregate domestic output and µ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution





®T¡tQt;T [pt(i) ¡ ¹MCT(i)] = 0
)
(2.11)
where ¹ ´ µ=(µ¡1) denotes the ¯rm's markup of prices over marginal costs and MCt(i) denotes
the nominal marginal cost for ¯rm i, which can be expressed as MCt(i) = MCt (yt(i)=Yt)
Á¡1,




































where ! ´ [(1 + ')Á ¡ 1] and ±t is a measure of price dispersion for domestic goods, and which






Therefore, it can be noticed that the aggregate supply of the economy, which will be obtained
by log-linearizing (2.11) along with the domestic price index law of motion, will depend on
both domestic and foreign output terms. Foreign output Y ¤
t , in fact, a®ects both the marginal
utility of income at which future pro¯ts are discounted (through Qt;T) and domestic ¯rms'
marginal costs (as shown by 2.13). An increase in foreign output produces two opposite
e®ects on marginal costs: a positive e®ect, as higher foreign output leads to higher domestic
consumption, hence to lower marginal utilities of consumption and income, and higher marginal
costs (with a size of the e®ect depending on
°
¾), but also a negative e®ect, since it leads to an
appreciation of the Home country's terms of trade and hence to a higher marginal utility of
income and lower marginal costs (whose impact is captured by °).
2.3. Aggregate Dynamics. After log-linearization of the equilibrium conditions around a
zero-in°ation steady state, the economy can be summarized by the following New Keynesian
5The Phillips curve is derived under the assumption of producer-currency pricing. Zaniboni (2008) studies
the e®ects of globalization on open-economy Phillips curves under the alternative cases of producer-currency
pricing, local-currency pricing, and dollar-dominant pricing. He shows, however, that the coe±cient on foreign
output, which is the main focus of this paper, is not a®ected by the modeling assumptions about the currency
in which exporters set prices.8 FABIO MILANI
model:
~ ¼t = ¯Et~ ¼t+1 + ·Hyt + ·Fy¤
t + ut (2.14)
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ ~ ¾Et (it ¡ ¼t+1) + #(1 ¡ ½¤)y¤
t + ´t (2.15)
it = ½it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[Â¼¼t + Âyyt] + "t; (2.16)
where ~ ¼t ´ ¼t¡¶¼t¡1. Equation (2.14) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve, in which the domestic
in°ation rate ¼t depends on expected and lagged in°ation rates (through the assumption of
partial indexation) and on both domestic and foreign output terms (denoted by yt and y¤
t).
The coe±cients ·H and ·F denote the sensitivity of in°ation to domestic and foreign economic
activity. Foreign output enters the aggregate supply relation because in the model marginal
costs do not depend exclusively on domestic production, but also on foreign production, since
the latter a®ects the marginal utility of income, which a®ects the wage demanded by domestic
workers. Equation (2.15) is the log-linearized Euler equation, which is derived under the
assumption that households consume a basket of domestically-produced and foreign-produced
goods. Current domestic output depends on its one-period-ahead expected value, on the
ex-ante real interest rate, and on foreign output. The coe±cient ~ ¾ denotes the sensitivity
of output to the ex-ante real interest rate, while # accounts for the in°uence of foreign on
domestic output. Equation (2.16) is a Taylor rule, which is assumed to describe monetary
policy decisions (the short-term nominal interest rate it is the policy instrument): Â¼ and Ây
denote the feedback coe±cients to in°ation and output, and ½ captures the inertial behavior
of policy rates. The variables ut and ´t denote supply and demand shocks and are assumed to
follow the AR(1) processes ´t = ½´´t¡1 +º
´
t and ut = ½uut¡1 +ºu
t , while the policy shock "t is
i.i.d. As ut and ´t may be both a®ected by technology and preference shocks, they are likely
to be correlated (hence their correlation ½´;u will also be estimated in the empirical section).
The foreign economy will not be treated as structural in the estimation. In a fully-structural
model, the foreign economy would be described by a set of equations that are the mirror image
of (2.14) to (2.16). This would require specifying a global Taylor rule and global Phillips
and IS curves with common coe±cients across the Home country's trading partners that will
be used to construct the global slack measure. I prefer here to avoid those assumptions: as
the main interest of the paper lies in inferring the e®ect of foreign output on the domestic
economy, misspeci¯cations of the foreign sector may unnecessarily bias the estimate of suchGLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 9
e®ect. Foreign output y¤
t, therefore, is assumed to evolve as an AR(1) process y¤
t = ½¤y¤
t¡1 +vt
in all cases, except for the model with the United States as the Home country. Since the
United States are widely believed to be an important driving force of global output, in that
case global output will be allowed to depend on U.S. variables, as
y¤
t = ½¤y¤
t¡1 + ±yyt¡1 + ±r(it¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1) + vt; (2.17)
where the coe±cients ±y and ±r denote the sensitivity of global slack to U.S. output and real
interest rates.
3. Global Slack Data
The model is estimated for each G-7 country (United States, Japan, Germany, France,
United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada), which is in turn treated as the Home economy. The
main objective in the estimation is to assess the e®ect of foreign or \global" output on domestic
macroeconomic variables, and, in particular, on the domestic in°ation rate.
For each country, I use quarterly data on in°ation, detrended output, short-term nominal
rates, along with the relevant foreign output series. Domestic output is given by the HP-
Filtered real GDP series (seasonally adjusted, smoothing parameter ¸ = 1;600), domestic
in°ation rates are calculated as the log di®erence in the GDP Implicit Price De°ator, while
short-term call money rates are used as the relevant monetary policy instruments (except for
the U.S., for which I use the federal funds rate, and for France, for which I use the three-month
Treasury rate).
To compute the relevant measure of global slack for each country, instead, I identify its
major 30 (40 for the U.S.) trading partners in 2007 and obtain quarterly data on their real
GDP as well as their exports and imports with the domestic country over the sample.6
Real GDP series for each trading partner are also detrended using the HP ¯lter (s.a., ¸ =
1;600).7 The relevant foreign output series for each G-7 country j, denoted by y¤
t;j, is then
calculated as the weighted average of its trading partners' detrended output series, where the
time-varying weights wi
t;j are given by the sum of Home country j's imports and exports with
trading partner i in each period t as a fraction of the total Home country j's imports and
6The lists of the countries that are used in the construction of the global slack measures, along with additional
details about the data, are reported in Appendix A.
7The HP ¯lter for all real GDP series is calculated using the full sample available for the series, rather than
only the post-1985 observations that will be used to estimate the structural model.10 FABIO MILANI








where i = 1;:::;N is an index for the di®erent trading partners, yi
t;j is the detrended output of











Similar global output measures have been used by Borio and Filardo (2007), who, however, use
a narrower measure based on the largest 10 trading partners for each country, and by Ihrig et
al. (2007). Borio and Filardo (2007) experiment with alternative de¯nitions of global output,
but their results do not vary. An advantage of this paper's global slack measure, compared with
Borio and Filardo's, is that it also incorporates information about business cycle °uctuations
in emerging market economies. The choice of using trade weights in the construction of global
slack is consistent with other papers (e.g., Borio and Filardo, 2007, Calza, 2008) and seems
reasonable given that bilateral trade °ows are still found to be the main source of global
linkages (e.g., Forbes and Chinn, 2004)
Figure 1 displays the domestic output gap along with the corresponding global output gap
series for each country in the sample. The correlation between the domestic and global output
gap series ranges from 0.261 for Japan to 0.75 for Italy and France: although the two strongly
comove, the correlations are never so high as to create problems of near-perfect collinearity in
the estimation. The relevant foreign output series for the European countries in the sample
appear very similar to each other (their correlation coe±cients, as shown in Table 1, are above
0.9), while the derived global slack series for the U.S., Canada, and especially Japan, are clearly
distinct (for example, the correlation coe±cients between global slack for Japan and those for
European countries are around 0.5).
4. Does Global Output Affect Domestic Inflation Rates?
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods to ¯t the data on detrended output, do-
mestic in°ation rates, nominal interest rates, and the relevant global output measure for each
8In few cases, data for a trading partner are available only at the annual, but not quarterly frequency: these
countries are dropped from the analysis (these cases, however, are marginal, as they refer to countries with
weights w
i
t;j close to zero, and, therefore, unlikely to have sizeable e®ects on the results). When data are instead
not available starting from 1985 for some trading partners, the countries are assigned a zero weight until the
¯rst quarter of available data, when they start being included in the global slack calculation.GLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 11
G-7 country (all variables are demeaned before the estimation). The sample in the estimation
starts from 1985:q1 and ends in 2007:q1 (with the exception of Germany, for which only post-
uni¯cation data are used and the sample is 1991:q1-2007:q1): the starting date is selected both
to be consistent with the choice in Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig et al. (2007) and because
the pace of globalization has signi¯cantly accelerated after the mid-1980s. The coe±cients to






The priors for the coe±cients in £ are described in Table 2. I assume a Gamma prior dis-
tribution with mean 0.05 and standard deviation 0.04 for the coe±cient ·H and a Normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.15 for the main parameter of interest ·F:
as there is not much existing evidence on the value of this parameter, the prior is centered at 0
and does not constrain ·F to be positive; its sign is, in fact, ambiguous from the theory. The
e®ect of the domestic output gap on in°ation, instead, is restricted to be positive. I assume
a Normal prior distribution for # with mean 0 and standard deviation 1: again, this prior is
meant to be rather uninformative, both in terms of sign and magnitude, about the sensitivity
of domestic to global variables. The coe±cient ~ ¾ follows a Gamma with mean 0.25 and stan-
dard deviation 0.175.9 As regards the monetary policy rule coe±cients, (Â¼ ¡ 1) has a prior
Gamma distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.35 (all the prior probability is
hence placed on values of Â¼ above 1 to ensure that the Taylor principle is satis¯ed, which
seems sensible for post-1985 monetary policies), and Ây has a normal prior distribution with
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.25.10 All the autoregressive coe±cients follow Beta prior
distributions, while inverse Gamma priors are used for the standard deviations of the shocks
and a N(0;0:32) prior distribution is assumed for the correlation coe±cient ½´;u between the
demand and supply shocks. The discount factor is, instead, treated as ¯xed in the estimation:
¯ = 0:99.
9I have repeated the estimation with a prior for ~ ¾ with a larger mean (Gamma prior with mean 1 and
standard deviation 0.7), but the empirical conclusions are una®ected.
10The paper implicitly assumes that there are no signi¯cant di®erences in the pre- and post-ECB monetary
policy rule coe±cients for Euro-area countries. While monetary policy is common in the Euro area, the Taylor
rules in the model include only country-speci¯c variables. This assumption is unlikely to have any in°uence
on the main results of interest. As a check, however, I re-estimate the models stopping the sample in 1998
for Germany, France, and Italy, and report the results in the robustness section. The main conclusions in the
empirical analysis are unchanged.12 FABIO MILANI
As the model is linear and the shocks are assumed to be normally-distributed, its likelihood
can be derived using the Kalman ¯lter at each iteration of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
which is used to sample from the posterior distribution (the estimation techniques are reviewed
in detail in An and Schorfheide, 2008). For each country, I estimate the model by running ¯ve
chains of 500,000 draws each, discarding the ¯rst 125,000 as initial burn-in.
4.1. Posterior Estimates. Table 3 shows the estimation results regarding the baseline model
for each G-7 country treated in turn as the relevant domestic economy.
The posterior mean estimates for ·F, which denotes the sensitivity of domestic in°ation to
global slack, are positive and equal to 0.019 for Italy, 0.0075 for the United States, and 0.0044
for France. The 95% highest posterior density intervals, however, never fall entirely above 0:
the probability of ·F being above zero given the data reaches 75% for Italy and the U.S. In the
other cases, global slack enters the in°ation equation with a negative sign (although typically
close to zero): the posterior mean for ·F equals -0.0003 for Japan, -0.004 for Canada, -0.013
for the U.K., and -0.019 for Germany. A negative sign has also been often found by Ihrig et al.
(2007) and it is not inconsistent with the theory, which leaves the sign of ·F ambiguous (e.g.,
CGG, 2002, Woodford, 2007). The estimates for the sensitivity of in°ation rates to domestic
slack, denoted by ·H, range from 0.019 for France to 0.048 for the U.K.
The results, however, do not imply that global slack does not play any role in most G-7
economies. The estimates, in fact, reveal a large impact of global output on domestic output.
The posterior mean estimates for the coe±cient # are equal to 0.852 for Canada, 0.742 for
France, 0.704 for Germany, 0.626 for the U.K., and 0.503 for Italy. The U.S. business cycle
is also a®ected by global economic developments (# = 0:841). The only country in which the
e®ect of global slack on domestic aggregate demand is modest is Japan: the mean estimate
for # is 0.148; the small e®ect is probably due to the particular developments in the Japanese
economy in the sample (which includes Japan's \lost decade" years), which were largely driven
by internal, rather than global, factors.
Turning to the other coe±cients, the degrees of in°ation indexation in the post-1985 sample
are limited in most countries (the values of ¶ range from 0.158 in Germany to 0.247 in the U.S.).
As the U.S. are usually regarded as an engine of global economic growth, in the estimation
with the U.S. as the Home country, global output is allowed to depend on past U.S. output
and real interest rates: the posterior mean for the coe±cients denoting the sensitivity of globalGLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 13
output to U.S. output (±y) is equal to 0.158 and to U.S. real interest rates (±r) is equal to -0.036
(Milani, 2009, ¯nds that the dependence on U.S. variables is larger in the pre-1979 period than
in the post-1985 period).
4.2. Model Comparison. To fully assess the role of global slack, besides looking at the
posterior estimates, one needs to verify whether its inclusion in the model improves the model's
ability to ¯t the data and, if it does, which channels matter.
The contribution of global slack is, therefore, evaluated by re-estimating the model for each
country and shutting down, in turn, either the foreign output e®ect through aggregate supply
(by setting ·F = 0) or the foreign output e®ect through aggregate demand (by setting # = 0).
The models' marginal likelihoods in these two alternative cases are then compared with the
marginal likelihood from the baseline model (in which both domestic and global slack are
included and whose estimates are reported in Table 3). Finally, I also consider a speci¯cation
in which the e®ect of domestic output on in°ation is shut down (setting ·H = 0): only global
slack enters the Phillips curve.
The log marginal likelihoods are shown in Table 4, along with the implied posterior model
probabilities. The inclusion of global output leads to improvements in the models' ability
to ¯t the data. The aggregate demand e®ect is important for all countries: the marginal
likelihoods, in fact, substantially decrease when that channel is shut down (# = 0). On the
other hand, there isn't much evidence of a direct e®ect of global output on domestic in°ation
in the sample of countries. The best speci¯cation for all countries is one in which global slack
enters the domestic IS equation, but not the supply equation. These model speci¯cations are
characterized by posterior model probabilities that extend from 0.6 to above 0.8. There is some
uncertainty about the best model speci¯cation, however, for Italy and France: in these cases,
the models with global-centric Phillips curves attain posterior probabilities between 0.27 and
0.39. Overall, however, for the majority of countries, the estimation does not provide much
evidence in support of altering traditional New Keynesian Phillips curves to include measures
of global slack.
Through its e®ect on domestic output, however, global output may still play an important
role in the determination of domestic in°ation rates. To verify the contribution of global slack
to °uctuations in in°ation, I compute the forecast error variance decomposition implied by
the model. Table 5 shows that innovations to global output can account for more than 20%14 FABIO MILANI
of output °uctuations in the U.K., Italy, and Canada, for 31% in Germany, and for 55% in
France. Business cycles in these countries, therefore, are largely a®ected by external economic
conditions. Mostly through that channel, global output shocks can also account for 13% of
in°ation °uctuations in France and for a smaller fraction in Canada and Italy (3-4%). Although
global output has an important e®ect on domestic output in Germany, the spillovers to in°ation
are trivial. The contribution of global output to domestic macroeconomic variables is, instead,
smaller in the U.S. and in Japan: global shocks account for 11% of the output variance in the
U.S. and for 7% of the in°ation variance, while the e®ects on Japanese variables are meager.
An implication of the empirical results is that globalization is unlikely to have induced
important changes in the way monetary policy should operate. The estimates, in fact, suggest
that monitoring global slack may be worthwhile as it in°uences domestic output in several
countries. But the e®ects on in°ation are still rather limited and, therefore, the e®ectiveness
of national policies is in no way compromised (Woodford, 2007, shows that this is true even
for scenarios in which the e®ects from foreign output are larger). Moreover, as the bene¯ts of
international monetary policy cooperation typically hinge on the values of the spillover e®ect
·F (e.g., CGG, 2002), the estimates suggest that these bene¯ts still remain small.
4.3. Robustness.
4.3.1. Trend in In°ation. Previous papers have found that assumptions about the existence of
a trend in in°ation may a®ect the estimates of coe±cients in the Phillips curve (e.g., Cogley
and Sbordone, 2008). In the baseline estimation, no trends have been removed from in°ation,
since trends are not immediately apparent in the post-1985 sample. To verify the sensitivity
of the empirical results, however, the models are re-estimated for each country using now a
detrended measure (using the HP ¯lter) of in°ation as an observable endogenous variable: the
trend is meant to account for changes in the Fed's long-run in°ation target. The dependent
variable is now in the same spirit as the in°ation gap studied in Cogley et al. (2009). The new
implied estimates for ·H and ·F are shown in Table 6 and do not alter the main conclusions:
the global slack term often enters the Phillips curve with a negative coe±cient and typically
one very close to zero (all the results described in the previous section also remain unchanged).
The estimates for the other coe±cients are similar: the only noticeable changes refer to the
indexation coe±cient and the autocorrelation of the cost-push shock, which fall closer to zeroGLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 15
(an indexation coe±cient near 0 is consistent with the results in Cogley and Sbordone, 2008,
who ¯nd that, after accounting for trend in°ation, no backward-looking terms are necessary
in the in°ation equation).
4.3.2. Euro-Area Monetary Policy. To check whether not accounting for changes in pre- and
post-ECB monetary policy in the Euro area has any e®ects on the results, I re-estimate the
models for France, Germany, and Italy with a sample that now ends in 1998:q4. The estimates
are comparable to those in Table 3 (·F is equal to 0.017 for France, -0.01 for Germany, and
0.013 for Italy) and the model rankings remain unaltered.
4.3.3. Priors' Choice. In the cases of Italy, France, and the U.S., some uncertainty remains
about the results, as global slack is estimated to be a positive determinant of their in°ation
rates, yet the model rankings favor speci¯cations that exclude global slack from the Phillips
curve. The model comparison results, however, may depend on the choice of the prior distri-
butions, particularly about the coe±cients ·H and ·F. Assuming a more informative prior
distribution about ·F, in particular, would have led to more favorable evidence for the model
with global output gap also entering the in°ation equation. For the U.S., the speci¯cation
preferred by the data, however, still remains the one that imposes ·F = 0 even if a tight prior
with standard deviation around 0.025 is assumed for ·F. For France and Italy, the marginal
likelihoods of the di®erent speci¯cations become much closer with a prior standard deviation
for ·F equal to 0.05, and the model rankings may switch for lower values (in light of the mixed
evidence on the sensitivity of in°ation to global slack coming from previous literature, however,
holding such an informative prior seems unlikely before seeing the data). As a further check, I
also increase the mean and standard deviation for the prior on ·H (now a Gamma with mean
0.1 and std. 0.08) and repeat the estimation: the model rankings do not change for the U.S.,
while they switch for France (the models' marginal likelihoods remain very close to each other
for Italy). The estimated coe±cients in the baseline models, instead, do not change. Therefore,
the conclusion from the variance decomposition that shocks to global output can account for
a modest portion of in°ation °uctuations in these countries is robust.
4.3.4. Correlation Among Shocks. The baseline estimation has assumed that shocks to do-
mestic and global output gaps were uncorrelated. I now allow these shocks to be correlated
and re-estimate the models for the U.S., France, and Italy. The largest estimated correlation16 FABIO MILANI
coe±cient is equal to 0.097, obtained for the U.S. speci¯cation; the remaining coe±cients and
the model comparison conclusions do not vary.
5. Conclusions
Recent studies have suggested an important role for global output as a variable driving
domestic in°ation rates.
This paper has investigated its empirical importance by estimating a structural model, which
captures the potential e®ects of global output on the domestic aggregate supply and demand
relations in the economy, for each G-7 country.
The empirical results indicate that global output °uctuations have a large impact on do-
mestic demand in most countries. Through this channel, the global output gap can also a®ect
domestic in°ation rates. The direct impact of global slack on marginal costs and in°ation,
however, appears less central: the data, in fact, favor model speci¯cations in which global
slack enters the IS curve, but generally they do not provide clear evidence in favor of altering
closed-economy Phillips curves to include global slack as an additional driving variable.
There are other channels through which globalization may a®ect the behavior of in°ation
and which have been omitted in the current paper. For example, the frequency of price changes
may be made endogenous and allowed to depend on the degree of competition, which may be
itself a function of the economy's openness to trade. The paper has also abstracted from the
channels recently emphasized by Sbordone (2007) and Guerrieri et al. (2007). Extending the
model in these directions may give a broader view of the empirical consequences of globalization
on in°ation dynamics.GLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 17
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Appendix A. Construction of Global Slack Series.
Data on U.S. real GDP, GDP implicit price de°ator, and the Federal Funds rate were obtained from
FRED R °, the Federal Reserve of St. Louis Economic Database. All data on real GDP, GDP implicit
price de°ators, and nominal interest rates for the remaining G-7 countries, on real GDP for the trading
partners included in the calculation of the \global slack" series, and on bilateral imports and exports,
were downloaded from IHS Global Insight.
The measure of global slack, denoted by y¤
t in the model, has been calculated for each G-7 country
using data on real GDP (NCUs, seasonally adjusted, detrended using the HP ¯lter, with smoothing
parameter ¸ = 1;600) for the following lists of trading partners:
² U.S.A.: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
U.K., Venezuela.
² JAPAN: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, U.K., U.S.A.
² GERMANY: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K.,
U.S.A..
² FRANCE: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., U.S.A.
² U.K.: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.A.
² ITALY: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K., U.S.A.
² CANADA: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indone-
sia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, U.K., U.S.A., Venezuela.20 FABIO MILANI
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t;Ger 0.758 0.529 1
y
¤
t;Fra 0.786 0.518 0.937 1
y
¤
t;UK 0.831 0.584 0.966 0.974 1
y
¤
t;Ita 0.767 0.492 0.958 0.937 0.947 1
y
¤
t;Can 0.678 0.725 0.640 0.615 0.670 0.607 1
Table 1 - Relevant Global Slack series for each G-7 country: correlation matrix (1985-2007).
Prior Distribution
Description Parameter Distr. Support Prior Mean Prior Std. Dev.
Discount Factor ¯ - - 0.99 -
In°. Indexation ¶ B [0;1] 0.5 0.2
Sensit. In°. to Domestic Slack ·
H ¡ R
+ 0.05 0.04
Sensit. In°. to Global Slack ·
F N R 0 0.15
Sensit. Output to Real Int. Rate ~ ¾ ¡ R
+ 0.25 0.175
Sensit. Output to Global Slack # N R 0 1
MP Inertia ½ B [0,1] 0.8 0.1
MP In°ation feedback (Â¼ ¡ 1) ¡ R
+ 0.5 0.35
MP Output feedback Ây N R 0.5 0.25
Std. Demand Shock ¾´ ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.25 0.25
Std. Cost-push Shock ¾u ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.25 0.25
Std. MP Shock ¾" ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.25 0.25
Std. Global Output Shock ¾y¤ ¡
¡1 R
+ 0.25 0.25
Autoregr. coe®. ´t ½´ B [0,1] 0.5 0.2




¤ B [0,1] 0.7 0.2
Corr(´t;ut) ½´;u N R 0 0.3
E®ect of US Output on Global Slack ±y N R 0 0.5
E®ect of US Real Rate on Global Slack ±r N R 0 0.5
Table 2 - Prior Distributions. Note: the same prior distributions are assumed for all countries.22 FABIO MILANI
Posterior Means and 95% HPD Intervals
Description Param. U.S. Japan Germany France U.K. Italy Canada
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Table 3 - Empirical Results: Posterior Estimates for all countries. The main entries denote posterior mean
estimates, while the numbers below in brackets denote 95% Highest Posterior Density (HPD) intervals.GLOBAL SLACK AND DOMESTIC INFLATION RATES 23
Log Marginal Likelihoods
Baseline Model No E®ect on AS (·


























































Table 4 - Bayesian Model Comparison.
Note: The log marginal likelihoods are computed using Geweke's modi¯ed harmonic mean approximation.
Bold face numbers denote the best-¯tting model speci¯cation for each country. The numbers in parentheses
below the log marginal likelihoods denote posterior model probabilities.
U.S. Japan Germany France U.K. Italy Canada
In°ation 7% 0.2% 0.04% 13% 1% 4% 3%
Output 11% 1% 31% 55% 20% 23% 27%
Table 5 - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: contribution of shock to global output to domestic in°ation
and output. The table reports the variance decomposition obtained for the baseline model speci¯cation (whose
corresponding estimates are reported in Table 3) for each country.24 FABIO MILANI
Description Param. U.S. Japan Germany France U.K. Italy Canada






























Table 6 - Robustness: Posterior Estimates for all countries (estimation with detrended in°ation series). The
main entries denote posterior mean estimates, while the numbers below in brackets denote 95% Highest Posterior
Density (HPD) intervals.